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CASE NOTES

TORTS-LIABILITY OF ICE CREAM STIEET VENDORSMOBILIZING THE INVITOR-INVITEE RELATIONSHIP
Defendant, Trowen Frozen Products, Inc., owned and operated an ice
cream vending business offering a wide assortment of ice cream products for
sale to the public. "[N]inety per cent of defendant's customers were children
ranging in age from 4 to 16; the best hours for making sales were from 4 to
7 p.m. when the children were home from school but before they went to
bed. .

.. "

Defendant's policy was to assign one employee per truck whose

job was to drive the truck and sell Trowen's products. The truck would proceed through a residential area, attracting customers from both sides of the
street with a mechanical loudspeaker system which continuously broadcast
a simple tune. When a potential customer attracted the driver's attention,
he would stop the truck at the right hand curb, alight from the truck, and
serve the customer. On May 14, 1964, five-year-old Carol Ann Ellis heard
the music emanating from defendant's approaching truck and ran to her
house to obtain money for a purchase. The driver, traveling east, had stopped
his ice cream truck almost opposite Carol's house to serve several customers.
Having obtained a quarter, Carol and her eight-year-old brother Rickey
hastily dashed down the driveway toward the truck. As they approached the
curb, their father, who was working on the car in the driveway, yelled,
"Stop." This he did as a precautionary measure and not out of awareness of
any specific danger. Rickey stopped at the curb, but Carol, in her haste,
continued into the street; she looked to the right but not the left. As she
entered the highway she was struck by an automobile traveling in the westbound lane at approximately twenty miles per hour. The ice cream salesman
testified that he was closing the compartments of the truck, preparatory to
leaving, when he observed the automobile traveling west; "he then heard a
'thud'; he did not see . . . [Carol] before she was struck by the car .... ,,2
Carol brought an action for personal injuries against the defendant vending
company3 by her guardian ad litem. At the close of plaintiff's case the trial
court sitting with a jury granted a nonsuit to the defendant, concluding,
"that it was unable to find a legal duty 'on the part of this defendant towards
this plaintiff under the particular circumstances. . .. ' "4 On appeal, judgment
was reversed for the plaintiff on the ground that there was a duty owed to
the plaintiff by defendant based upon an invitor-invitee theory of negligence.
Ellis v. Trowen Frozen Products, Inc., 264 Cal. App. 2d 499, 70 Cal. Rptr.
487 (1968).
1 Ellis v. Trowen Frozen Products, Inc., 264 Cal. App. 2d 499, 501, 70 Cal. Rptr. 487,
489 (1968).
2 Id.
3

The driver-salesman of the vending truck was not a party to the suit, and the action

against the defendant owner and operator of the automobile was dismissed.
4 Supra note 1, at 502, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
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The objectives of this note are: to analyze the efficacy of the theory of
liability expounded in Ellis, in itself and in light of a number of representative
cases in which the courts advanced other theories of liability in similar fact
situations; 5 to set forth some observed implications and consequences of
these decisions; and to synthesize some intimations in reference to these
theories.
In the street ice cream vending type cases or "Pied Piper" cases, as they
are often denoted, an ever present element is that of attraction to the truck
of its predominantly youthful customers. This is principally due to the nature
of these trucks-their generally elaborate decorations, sound devices, and
lights. This notion of "attraction" has induced numerous courts into an
evaluation of the doctrine of "attractive nuisance" in determining the liability
of the defending party. The consequence has been an almost universal rejection of this doctrine in the "Pied Piper" situation. 6
The rule, first known as the "turntable doctrine," was expounded in Railroad Co. v. Stout 7 in 1873. Two years later it acquired the designation of
"attractive nuisance" from its application in Keffe v. Milwaukee and St.
Paul R. Co.8 wherein the court was preoccupied with the concepts of allurement and enticement. In common legal parlance:
Under the attractive nuisance doctrine liability is imposed for injuries to children
of tender years, even
are the result of the
precautions to prevent
he should know would

though they are technical trespassers, where such injuries
failure of the owner or person in charge to take proper
injuries to children by instrumentalities or conditions which
naturally attract them into unsuspected danger.,

It will be observed that the rationale of the doctrine, based upon legally
recognized policy considerations, is to hold liable the defendant possessor of
5 For a further discussion and explanation of these theories, see 19 ALA. L. REV. 228
(1966); 18 ARK. L. REV. 178 (1964); Comment, Torts: Pied Piper Doctrine-Right of
Recovery of Children Attracted into Street by Vendors for Injury by Another Vehicle,
3 TULSA L.J. 146 (1966).

OMead v. Parker, 221 F. Supp. 601 (E.D.
1965) ; Burkett v. Southern Belle Dairy Co.,
v. American Insurance Group, 158 So. 2d
Softee, Inc., 19 Ohio Op. 2d 446, 184 N.E.2d

Tenn. 1963), aff'd, 340 F.2d 157 (6th Cir.
272 S.W.2d 661 (Ky. App. 1954) ; Molliere
279 (La. App. 1963) ; Sidders v. Mobile
115 (1961). See generally Ice Delivery Co.

v. Thomas, 290 Ky. 230, 160 S.W.2d 605 (1942) (ice delivery truck not "attractive nuisance") ; Baker-Evans Ice Cream Co. v. Tedesco, 114 Ohio St. 170, 150 N.E. 745 (1926)
(ice cream truck making deliveries held not "attractive nuisance"); Coffey v. Oscar
Mayer & Co., 252 Wis. 473, 32 N.W.2d 235 (1948) (ice truck stopping at intervals to
make deliveries held not "attractive nuisance"); Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 758 (1949); Annot.,
74 A.L.R.2d 1056 (1960).
784 U.S. 657 (1873).
8 21 Minn. 207, 18 Am. R. 393 (1875).
9 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 63(71) (1966) (emphasis added).
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land who could otherwise plead trespass.' 0 Convincingly, this doctrine as
originally conceived, applies to owners and possessors of land and objects
thereon, and, as stated, modern judicial sentiment has held it inapplicable
to the mobile street vendor case." Moreover, in Sidders v. Mobile Softee,
Inc.,1 2 the court rejected the "attractive nuisance" doctrine on the basis

that a street vending operation does not constitute a nuisance, when it
declared:
The defendant is accused of being a sort of modem Pied Piper and as such
responsible for any and all mishaps to its young customers. It is not an insurer
of the safety of its patrons. Nor is it charged with a violation of law. The operation of an ice cream vending truck attractive to children is admittedly not a
nuisance.' 3
As in most jurisdictions today, the American Law Institute's Restatement
(Second) of Torts does not predicate its reformulation of the "attractive
nuisance" doctrine on the element of attractiveness,' 4 but recognizes "that
the basis of the rule is merely the ordinary negligence basis of a duty of
reasonable care not to inflict foreseeable harm on another. .

. ."

Although,

as stated above, the "attractive nuisance" doctrine in its traditional character
has been rejected in the "Pied Piper" situation, the rule of the Restatement,
as contrasted with that doctrine, has received pseudo recognition in such a
case, Mackey v. Spradlin.'6
In Mackey the Court of Appeals of Kentucky reversed and remanded a
judgment upon a directed verdict for defendant operators and owners in a
suit brought by the administrator of the estate of a seven year old who was
killed when he darted from behind the vendor's ice cream wagon into the
side of a passing truck. The court recognized that they were not dealing with
an "attractive nuisance" case but announced that "much the same policy
considerations the attractive nuisance theory was designed to recognize and
satisfy" were present and "[t]he differences are superficial.' 7 Judge Palmore
said:
101d.;

2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW or TORTS § 27.5, at 1447-50 (1956); PROSSER,

TORTS § 59, at 372-77 (3d ed. 1964).

11Supra note 6.
12 19 Ohio Op. 2d 446, 184 N.E.2d 115 (1961).

13 Id. at 448, 184 N.E.2d at 117.
14

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS

§

15 Id., comment (b) at 198. See also
cited therein.
16 397 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. App. 1965).
17

Id. at 37.

339 (1965).
PROSSER,

supra note 10, § 59, at 374, and cases
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The danger is enhanced by the sense of haste that is purposely aroused in the
children of a neighborhood by the tinkling of bells and flashing of lights heralding
the imminent arrival of an attraction that will stay but a moment and be gone
unless they come at once. . . . Common sense and the most minimal regard for
humanity suggest that one who intentionally attracts small children to a place in
or so close to a street or highway that there is danger of their being struck by
passing traffic should be under a duty to maintain a lookout for such traffic and,
if he observes or in the exercise of ordinary care should observe a vehicle
approaching close enough to constitute an immediate hazard, to warn the children
present in the immediate area of the attraction or make such other reasonable
18
effort to prevent their being injured as may be necessary in the circumstances.
In Mackey, therefore, the court states that they do not have an "attractive
nuisance" case; yet they utilize "attractive nuisance" principles in justifying
reversal of the trial court. Of distinct importance, however, is the fact that
in Mackey the vendors were held negligent as a matter of law for failing to
exercise reasonable care to prevent the accident in not keeping a lookout on
behalf of their customer. "The gist of their [vendors'] negligence is that they
should have realized the danger of just such an accident . .. "19 Perceiving
that the "gist" of defendants' negligence rested in their failure to foresee
the possibility of harm to the plaintiff while utilizing "attractive nuisance"
principles, the court has in effect applied the Restatement's reformulation
of the "attractive nuisance" doctrine to a "Pied Piper" case. That is to say
that in Mackey the court properly observed that the basis of the "attractive
nuisance" doctrine is no longer attractiveness but "merely the ordinary
negligence basis of a duty of reasonable care not to inflict foreseeable harm
on another .
,,2o However, the doctrine as so expounded, is, as the Restatement indicates, applicable to "a possessor of land, " 2 1 and generally is applied
22
only to trespassers.
Clearly by the weight of authority, the "attractive nuisance" doctrine per
se is inapplicable to the "Pied Piper" case.2 3 A recognition of the Restatement's reformulated conception of 'the "attractive nuisance" doctrine 24 was,
in effect, made in Mackey. Such a consideration of the doctrine acknowledges
that its true basis is an exercise of care so as not to inflict forseeable harm
on another. But why is this evasive process via "attractive nuisance" principles necessary, when all that the court need consider when confronted with
the issue of a defendant vendor's negligence is his conduct as against that of
18 1d. at 37-38 (emphasis added).
19 Id. at 38.
20

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

21 Supra note 14.
22 Supra note 10.

23 Supra notes 6, 10 and 14.
24

Supra note 14.

§ 339 comment (b).
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a reasonable man under the circumstances?2 Such a consideration was the
basis of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case of
26
Jacobs v. Draper.
The factual situation in Jacobs is quite similar to that in Ellis, the principal case. Defendant's employee had stopped his musically equipped ice
cream truck to serve plaintiff's son as well as other customers. As three and
one-half year old Patrick darted from in front of the ice cream truck on his
return across the street, he was struck by an automobile and died shortly
thereafter. The automobile driver was exonerated of responsibility, but the
jury found the defendant business owner negligent. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota affirmed, stating "[we] are satisfied . . . that the jury could
properly find that . . . [the defendant] did not discharge his common-law

duty to use due care not to injure plaintiff's child." 7 The question of
defendant's negligence was one of fact, rather than one of law, as in Mackey.
The court, cognizant that the defendant "used recorded music to attract
customers, and was selling a product enticing in itself to children," 28 cited
the Mackey case with favor and recognized, as did the Mackey court, that
such a "Pied Piper" case is vested with many of the same policy considerations the "attractive nuisance" theory was designed to recognize and satisfy.
Notwithstanding, the theory in Jacobs rested solely upon the common law
basis of negligence. The court declared:
Whether or not a duty has been violated depends upon the risks of the situation,
the dangers known or reasonably to have been foreseen, and all of the then existing
circumstances. .

.

. Where a person knows or has reason to know that children

are likely to be in the vicinity, the greater hazard created by their presence or
probable presence is a circumstance to be considered in determining whether
however, always remains the same-reasonreasonable care was used. The duty,
2
able care under the circumstances. 9
The court further noted:
[W]hen children are in the vicinity, much is necessarily to be expected of them
which would not be looked for on the part of an adult. It may be anticipated that
a child will dash into the street in the path of a car. . . . In all such cases, the
question comes down essentially to one of whether the risk outweighs the utility
of the actor's conduct.a°
25 The reasonable man conducts himself so as not to expose others to unreasonable
risks of foreseeable harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 298, 302-03 (1965).
See generally PROSSER, supra note 10, §§ 31-32.
26 274 Minn. 110, 142 N.W.2d 628 (1966).

Id. at 116, 142 N.W.2d at 632 (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 117, 142 N.W.2d at 633.
29 d. at 113, 142 N.W.2d at 631 (emphasis added).
27

SOld. at 117, 142 N.W.2d at 633 (emphasis added). Compare Mackey v. Spradlin,
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The gist of defendant's negligence was that under the circumstances he
should have foreseen just such an accident. The circumstances to be considered
by the jury in relating defendant's conduct to that of a reasonable man were:
that the truck was parked in an area where many children resided; that
music was used to attract customers; and that the product sold was in itself
enticing to children. These factors of attractiveness and enticement were
merely circumstances to be considered by the jury and not the keystone for
the application of "attractive nuisance" principles as in Mackey.
A secondary theory of liability, which at times appears in a case of this
nature,3 1 was presented in Jacobs, but not determined therein. Defendant's
ice cream truck had been parked in violation of a parking ordinance and a
Minnesota statute which imposed a duty upon a vehicle operator toward
pedestrians. The court refused to consider the duty so imposed, stating that
such violations "would only be cumulative with his breach of the commonlaw duty of due care."' 32 In Mead v. Parker,33 one theory of recovery employed

by plaintiff was that defendant was negligent in parking on the wrong side
of the street in violation of a city ordinance. The Court of Appeals held, in
part, that plaintiff was not a member of the class which the lawmaking body
intended to protect by the ordinance. Thus, violation of that ordinance con3
stituted no negligence toward the non-beneficiary child. 4
However, notwithstanding Mead, once a statute or ordinance has been
found to be applicable, one of three consequences follows a violation
thereof, depending upon the jurisdiction: a violation will be conclusive of
negligence--this is termed negligence per se; 3 5 a "violation creates a presumption of negligence, which may be rebutted by a showing of an adequate
excuse but calls for a binding instruction in the absence of such evidence"; 31 or a violation will constitute evidence of negligence to be
accepted or rejected by the jury.3 7 This theory of negligence, based upon the
supra note 16 (risk outweighs utility) with Mead v. Parker, supra note 6 and Goff v.
Carlino, 181 So. 2d 426 (La. App. 1965) (utility outweighs risk).
31 See, e.g., Mead v. Parker, supra note 6; Landers v. French's Ice Cream Co., 98 Ga.
App. 317, 106 S.E.2d 325 (1958) ; Vought v. Jones, 205 Va. 719, 139 S.E.2d 810 (1965);
Saulsbury v. Williams, 205 Va. 727, 139 S.E.2d 816 (1965).
32 Supra note 26, at 119, 142 N.W.2d at 634.
33

Supra note 6.

34 Before liability can be based upon the violation of a statute, the person harmed
must show that he is a member of the class which the legislature intended to protect by
the enactment of the statute. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288 (1965);
65 C.J.S. Negligence § 19(5) (d) (1966) ; 'ROSSER, supra note 10, § 35, at 202.
35 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 288B (1965); 65 C.J.S. Negligence
§ 19(3) (1966) ; PROSSER, supra note 10, § 35.
36 PROSSER, supra note 10, § 35.
37 See, e.g., 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 19(2)

(1966) ; PROSSER, supra note 10, § 35.
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violation of a validly pleaded statute or ordinance, has been successfully
employed as negligence per se and evidence of negligence in the "Pied
38

Piper" situation.

In Landers v. French's Ice Cream Company, 9 the plaintiff alleged negligence against the defendant vendor because he was illegally parked in
violation of applicable ordinances. The appeals court, recognizing that the
violations constituted negligence per se, held that defendant vendor's alleged
violation of a city ordinance "presented a jury question as to whether the
alleged negligence of [the defendant] was a concurring proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injuries. ' 40 The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia,
adopting the position that a violation constitutes evidence of negligence, in
Saulsbury v. Williams,41 affirmed a lower court decision regarding the propriety of a jury's finding that a street vendor was negligent in parking his
truck in violation of a provision of the state code. Plaintiff alleged the violation of a code providing that the truck shall not park so as to render "dangerous
the use of the highway by others" 42 ; the jury found the defendant negligent
based upon violation of that provision. A companion case to Saulsbury is
Vought v. Jones,43 wherein plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent
in stopping or parking on the road and dispensing ice cream in violation of
certain city ordinances. At the close of plaintiff's evidence, the trial judge
entered a summary judgment for defendants. The reviewing court reversed
and held that the question of defendants' negligence, based on a violation of
the ordinance, was a question for the jury. The evidence produced by the
plaintiff also presented a jury question pertaining to any possible violations
by the defendant of duties or obligations owed to the plaintiff based on
common law principles. The court summarily asserted that since the plaintiff was a business invitee, the defendant was under a duty to provide a
reasonably safe place for the plaintiff-invitee, and that a determination as to
whether this obligation had been fulfilled was properly a question for the
jury. This theory of a common law duty arising out of a "Pied Piper"
situation based on an invitor-invitee relationship received full expansion in
44
Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Limited.
Defendant owner was in the business of selling bakery products from a
38 Landers v. French's Ice Cream Co., supra note 31; Saulsbury v. Williams, supra
note 31; Vought v. Jones, supra note 31.
39 Supra note 31; see also Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1050 (1960).
40 Landers v. French's Ice Cream Co., supra note 31, at 321, 139 S.E.2d at 329.
41 Supra note 31.
42Saulsbury v. Williams, supra note 31, at 731, 139 S.E.2d at 819, quoting from VA.
CODE ANN., § 46.1-248 (Repl. Vol. 1958).
43

Supra note 31.

44 67 Cal. 2d 232, 430 P.2d 68 (1967).
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truck which traveled up and down residential streets. The defendant driver
knew the four-year-old plaintiff, and when the child asked the driver to
wait for him while he went home to get a dime, the driver told the child that
he would proceed up the street and wait for him there. After making several
sales, the driver prepared to depart, believing the child would no longer
arrive. At that moment the plaintiff shouted, "Hey, wait!" and darted out
into the street where he was struck by a car.4 5
The defendants owner and driver contended that they owed no duty to the
plaintiff under the circumstances. The Supreme Court of California held
that the defendants had established two legal relationships with the plaintiff; and, "[f]rom each such relationship the common law imposes a duty
upon defendants to exercise ordinary care for the safety of persons such as
plaintiff, and to avoid the creation of unreasonable risks of foreseeable
harm. '46 The first legal relationship was established when the driver undertook to direct the conduct of the plaintiff. "A second and concomitant legal
relationship arose between the child and the driver when the driver invited
the child to become a customer of his business. '47 Whether or not the duties
so established had been fulfilled was a question of fact for the jury, and the
trial court was held to have erred in removing that question from them.
This application of the invitor-invitee relationship to a street vending
situation so as to establish a duty on the part of the vendor is a novel extension of that theory of liability. The status of the vendor as a business
invitor was first expressed in Vought v. Jones ;48 however, Justice Eggleston
offered no explanation of the applicability of the doctrine in his opinion.
This ratiocination was provided in Schwartz and followed in Ellis.
Clearly, in Schwartz, defendant vendor expressly invited the infant plaintiff to become a customer, thus establishing the relationship. Once acquiring
a status as an invitor, the vendor assumed "the duty to exercise reasonable
care to prevent his [plaintiff's] being injured on 'the premises.' 49 This
concept of "premises," Justice Tobringer comments, may be less or greater
than the invitor's property. Of further consequence in an invitor-invitee
relationship is the factor of control over the "premises," for, as the court
declares, "[t]he crucial element is control

. .

.";and a vendor will be liable

for an injury caused on his "premises," "if, and only if, the injury is caused
45 The defendant automobile driver was dismissed with prejudice and her liability was
not at issue.
46 Supra note 44, at 236, 430 P.2d at 70.
47 Supra note 44, at 236, 430 P.2d at 70. (emphasis added).
48
49

Supra note 31.

Supra note 44, at 239, 430 P.2d at 72-73.
50 Supra note 44, at 239, 430 P.2d at 73.
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by a dangerous condition, or unreasonable risk of harm, within the invitor's
control.",1
Schwartz was decided by the Supreme Court of California in July, 1967.
In July, 1968, a California appeals court decided the Ellis case, relying
heavily on Schwartz, but establishing the defendant vendor's duty on his
status as an invitor created by implied invitation. The court in Ellis announced:
[W]hen an actor . . . has a product which is sold on its trucks on public

streets to a very high percentage of child customers, and in so doing uses a
commonly recognized sound device which a child relates to the product, the actor
has extended an invitation to children who are attracted to and desire to purchase
the product. . . . The potential customers who are attracted to and who approach
52
the truck are classed as invitees.

Arguing the validity of such a basis upon which to found the relationship,
the appellants in their brief stated:
Seldom is there an express invitation as in Schwartz. The normal situation is an
implied invitation to become a business invitee. Schwartz should therefore apply

to our case to raise a duty in defendant
to exercise toward plaintiff the care of a
53
reasonable and prudent person.
The implied invitation so constituted by defendant's music and manner of
operation has the same vital effect as an express invitation, and on that basis
there is no legal ground on which to distinguish the two cases. 54 These factors
of allurement, enticement, and attractiveness, which in Mackey, discussed
above, were regarded as factors prompting a decision on grounds analogous
to an "attractive nuisance" situation, in the novel Ellis case, constituted
elements adducing an implied invitation. The court in Schwartz, recognizing
the inapplicability of the traditional "attractive nuisance" theory in a "Pied
Piper" situation, commented: "the attractive nuisance doctrine, as such, is
generally applied only to trespassers ... ,5- and that in defining the vendor's
duty in terms of his status as an invitor, this court avoided the necessity of
expressing an opinion as to whether defendant's truck constituted an "attractive nuisance"56 as the courts found necessary in both Mackey v. Spradlin
and Jacobs v. Draper,both discussed above.
51 Supra note 44, at 243 n.1o, 430 P.2d at 75 n.10 (emphasis added).
52 Supra note 1, at 502, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 490. (emphasis added).
53 Brief for Appellant at 7, Ellis v. Trowen Frozen Products, Inc., supra note 52
(emphasis added).
54 It is a firmly established proposition that an invitation may be express or implied and
the duties of the invitor are the same in either case. See 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 63(41),
at 715, 716 (1966).
55
56

Supra note 44, at 236 n.2, 430 P.2d at 70-71 n.2.
Supra note 44, at 236 n.2, 430 P.2d at 70 n.2.
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Establishing defendant's standing as an invitor imposes upon him a more
limited duty than that impressed upon the vendor in Jacobs wherein defendant's duty was purely that imposed by the common law. The essential
elements of "premises" and control composing the duty of the vendor in
Ellis and Schwartz, by their nature, limit the common law duty of exercising
ordinary care to prevent exposing others to unreasonable risks of foreseeable
harm to those persons on the "premises" under the control of the defendant
peddler. Two questions arise: (1) what are defendant's "premises," and (2)
are those "premises" under his control?
In Ellis the court commented that, "[t] he courts would be blind to reality
if the 'area' or 'premises' were, in the case at bench or under like facts, confined to the truck itself."15 7 The Schwartz court cites several cases 5s in support
of its proposition that "premises" need not be confined to the invitor's property but may be constituted by an area less than his property Or encompass an
area beyond the bounds thereof. Just what constitutes this element of "premises," a necessary element in defining defendant's duty, must be established,
for under this novel theory, the vendor's duty only extends to those on the
"premises." It is in this manner that the scope of defendant's duty is limited,
and the limitation applies to the immediate vicinity, for as Justice Tobriner
declared:
The driver, as invitor,

. .

. may be held to the duty of exercising such reasonable

care for plaintiff's safety in the immediate vicinity of the truck as would be
expected of an ordinarily prudent man in the same circumstances. 5 9
Not only is the defendant's common law duty limited to the immediate
vicinity by characterizing the vendor as an invitor, but the jury must be
instructed that the "premises" must be under his control and supervision.
Accordingly, the scope of the common law duty imposed upon the vendor
is further limited. The Supreme Court in Schwartz summed it up most
explicitly when it said:
Defendants may therefore be held liable for an injury occurring to their customer
in the immediate vicinity of the truck if the circumstances causing60the injury are
within the range of defendants' reasonable supervision and control.
These explicated shortcomings in California's theory of establishing a
vendor's duty on an invitor-invitee relationship, without considering the
legitimacy of applying the concepts of such a relationship to a mobile street
vending situation, concomitant with the substantial rejection of the "attractive
57

Supra note 52.

5sSupra note 44, at 239 nn.5 & 6, 430 P.2d at 73 nn.5 & 6. See also PROSSzR, TORTS
§ 61, at 401-02 (3d ed. 1964).
59 Supra note 44, at 242-43, 430 P.2d at 75 (emphasis added).
60 Supra note 44, at 243 n.10, 430 P.2d at 75 n.10 (emphasis added).
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nuisance" doctrine in the "Pied Piper" situation, exemplifies the merit of the
workable theory expounded in Jacobs v. Draper.61
It will be recalled that in Jacobs, defendant's liability rested solely upon
the common law basis of negligence, that is, the duty to use ordinary care so
as to avoid the creation of unreasonable risks of foreseeable harm.6 2 The
feasibility of this theory becomes most apparent when it is recognized that
by basing the vendor's duty on this common law principle a threefold
benefit is obtained: (1) the court may avoid any decision as to whether or
not the "Pied Piper" operation constitutes an "attractive nuisance"; 63 (2)
the scope of the common law duty is not reduced to the immediate vicinity
under the vendor's control; and (3) this duty is ever present and thus precludes as a prerequisite thereto the establishment of either an "attractive
nuisance" type situation64 or an invitor-invitee relationship.
In light of the cases examined and the criticisms advanced, it is aptly
observed that when confronted with a "Pied Piper" case and the issue
before the court is whether or not the defendant vendor bears any duty
toward the plaintiff, the most feasible basis of establishing a duty is upon
that ever present common law duty to use ordinary care so as to avoid the
creation of unreasonable risks of foreseeable harm. 65 Submission to the
jury as a question of fact the issue of the fulfillment of this duty should
be accompanied by a consideration of the effect of a violation of any appropriate statute or ordinance. Where a statute or ordinance regulating the
usage of public streets by vehicles is found to apply to the defendant vendor,
his violation thereof may be evidence of negligence or a determinative
factor in establishing the alleged negligence.
The diversity of legal theory employed in these similar fact situations
suggests a fertile area for legislative enactment to establish a statutory duty
on the part of a street vendor. 66 Undoubtedly, the standard of conduct for
the street peddler "may be defined and established by a legislative enactment
which lays down requirements of conduct, and provides expressly or by
61

Supra note 26.

632-33. See generally PROSSER, supra note
58, §§ 31-32.
63 As heretofore established, the "attractive nuisance" doctrine has been substantially
rejected in the "Pied Piper" situation; furthermore, the "doctrine" is applicable to
possessors of land and is generally applied to trespassers.
64 It will be recalled that in Mackey v. Spradlin, discussed supra, although the defendants were negligent for failing to exercise reasonable care, this duty arose out of a
de facto "attractive nuisance" situation.
65 See Thomas v. Goodies Ice Cream Co., 13 Ohio App. 2d 67, 233 N.E.2d 876 (1968)
wherein the court held defendant vendor owed to the plaintiff this common law duty.
66 It is well established that a duty may be imposed by the common law or by
legislative enactment. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965); 65
C.J.S. Negligence § 1(4), at 444-45 (1966); PROSSER, supra note 58, § 35, at 191 &
nn.84-85.
62 Supra note 26, at 115-17, 142 N.W.2d at
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implication that a violation shall entail civil liability in tort. '67 In establishing the character of the vendor's conduct several factors of prime importance would merit legislative consideration.
The judicial decisions establishing the requisite manner of the vendor's
conduct evolved in a restricted atmosphere in that the plaintiff, in each case
of moment, was a child of "tender years, ' 68 thus precluding an issue of
contributory negligence. Some courts still adhere to arbitrary age limits
regarding a child's negligence 69 in holding that a child under seven years
is incapable of negligence, that between seven and fourteen years he is
presumed incapable but may be shown to be capable, and that from
fourteen to twenty-one years he is presumed capable, but that the contrary
may be shown. 7o However, a majority of courts have held a child under seven
years to be capable of some negligence. 71 The effect of contributory negligence
in the absence of modifying legislation is to act as a complete bar to
plaintiff's recovery. 72 The legislature, therefore, in pronouncing the standard
of conduct to which a street vendor must conform, may increase or decrease the scope of that duty by including provisions with respect to the
contributory negligence of an infant plaintiff. The efficacy of such a consideration is of prime importance since by the nature of the ice cream
vendor's business, an overwhelming majority of his customers are children.
A further point of consideration in formulating a standard by which a
street vendor must conduct his operation is the degree to which that standard
might work a hardship upon the vendor. The concept of hardship is juxtaposed with two other concepts: the utility of the ice cream vendor's operation, and what he can do or may be required to do to ensure compliance
with his obligations. InGoff v. Carlino73 the court stated:
[P]arking the ice cream truck in the residential area undoubtedly created the
foreseeable hazard that a careless child might be injured in crossing the street. But
selling ice cream from mobile trucks in residential areas is a lawful business with
social value; it would be virtually impossible to engage in this business if the ice
OF TORTS § 285, comment (b) at 21 (1965).
68 In Ellis v. Trowen Frozen Products, Inc., the child plaintiff was 5 years old; Mackey
67 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

v. Spradlin, 7 years old; Jacobs v. Draper, 3 years old; Mead v. Parker, 5 years old;
Landers v. French's Ice Cream Co., 5 years old; Saulsbury v. Williams, 3 years old;
Vought v. Jones, 5 years old; and in Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Limited, 4 years old.
69"[C]ontributory negligence, in general, is determined and governed by the same
tests and rules as the negligence of the defendant."

PROSSER,

supra note 58, § 64, at

429. See also 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 144 (1966).
70 PROSSER, supra note 58, § 32, at 158 & nn.56-58.
71 PROSSER, supra note 58, at 158 n.60.
72 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 467 & Special Note (1965); PROSSER,
supra note 58, § 64, at 435.
73 181 So. 2d 426 (La. App. 1965).
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cream peddler could not park or if he were required
to watch out for and to guide
74
children across the streets to and from the truck.
Thus, the judge in Goff held that the legal utility of the peddler's operation
outweighed the risk of foreseeable harm and, therefore, the risk was not an
unreasonable one.75 To hold that the risk outweighed the utility would raise
a controvertible issue as to the probable imposition of a hardship upon the
vendor by necessitating a change in the manner of his operation concomitant
with the outweighing risk. The greater the degree of change deemed necessary,
the greater the potential hardship, extending to the point of making it virtually impossible to engage in the business. Also, in Mead v. Parker the court
held, "that it would have been extremely difficult for the defendants to have
prevented any obvious danger to youthful purchasers of its merchandise without totally destroying the usefulness of the vending truck . . . ",,76
likewise
implying that the nature of the business dictates that a change in operational
77
procedure would work a hardship upon the huckster.
This factor of the social utility of an ice cream peddler's operation, as
opposed to the risk of harm he creates, must be examined by legislative
draftsmen in light of what measures might be imposed upon the vendor to
reduce this risk and yet not destroy the economic feasibility of his business.
It may be suggested that a number of measures be taken which could easily
and economically make safer these ice cream vending operations: (1) the
vendor might discourage children from crossing the street by returning
shortly traveling in the opposite direction in order to serve them; (2) a
hired man or boy could ride on the truck to act as a crossing guard when
the truck stopped for customers; (3) the truck could be equiped with
78
flashing lights so as to warn motorists that customers are in its vicinity;
and (4) the possible dangers of the street could be broadcast over a loudspeaker system relaying a repetitive message of warning. Pragmatically, the
increase in operational costs necessitated by expenditures on these safety
measures would boost the price of the product proportionally; thus, the
customer himself would pay for his added protection. Consequently, the
vendor sustains no penalty and the customer, generally a child, is afforded
added safety.
Dennis Michalek
74 Id. at 428.
75
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 & comment (d) (1965).
76340 F.2d 157, 159 (6th Cir. 1965).
77See also Molliere v. American Insurance Group, 158 So.2d 279, 283 (La. App.
1963), wherein the court argued that to hold defendant vendor's truck an "attractive
nuisance" would bring all highway vendors within the realm of the doctrine and impose
upon them "unusual

precautionary measures to prevent accidents"

to their young

customers.
78 Brief for Appellant, supra note 53, at 9 (source of first three suggestions).

